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ABSTRACT:  
The purpose of this paper is to defend a deflationary account of the ethical value of narrative 
representation.  In §§1-2 I demonstrate that there is a necessary relation between narrative 
representation and ethical value, but not between narrative representation and moral value.  
Ethical is conceived in terms of moral as opposed to amoral and moral in terms of moral as 
opposed to immoral and the essential value of narrative representation is restricted to the 
former.  Recently, both theorists involved in the ethical turn in criticism and analytic 
philosophers have erred in conflating these two distinct kinds of value.  In §§3-5 I defend my 
deflationary view against three attempts to elevate the ethical value of narrative 
representation to moral value: Martha Nussbaum’s theory of realist novels, Noël Carroll’s 
virtue wheels, and Geoffrey Galt Harpham’s closural moral order. 
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1. Narrative & Non-Narrative Representation 
 
My starting point is to take “narrative” and “story” as synonymous.  Representations of real 
and fictional sequences of events can be communicated in narrative and non-narrative form 
by a variety of means, including the written and spoken word and still and moving images.  I 
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shall distinguish between narrative and non-narrative representations, but not between 
narratives that represent real and fictional events or between linguistic and visual narratives.1  
A minimal narrative is the product of an agent that represents:  
(a) one or more agents 2 and  
(b)  two or more events which are  
(c)  connected. 
Gregory Currie begins his discussion of narrativity by noting that all representations are 
created rather than found and therefore the product of a process of intentional shaping.3  A 
consequence of this intentionality is that there are two perspectives that can be adopted 
towards representations, the external and internal: 
Adopting the external perspective, we see a vehicle, something that represents a 
sequence of events in virtue of the activity of an agent we call the author.  Adopting 
the internal perspective, we examine the world of the story as if it were actual […].4 
  
Narrativity is gradational rather than categorical, i.e. admits of degrees.  The manner in which 
(a) and (b) contribute to narrativity is straightforward, but (c) has been subject to much 
debate.  Peter Lamarque takes the broadest view of the requisite connection, claiming that: 
there must be some more or less loose, albeit non-logical, relation between the events.  
Crucially, there is a temporal dimension in narrative, not just in the sense that 
                                                 
1 My preference is to distinguish representations of real sequences of events from representations of fictional 
sequences of events in terms of the different role played by the imagination in the respective engagement with 
each.  Derek Matravers has recently questioned this distinction, first claiming that there is no relevant difference 
between the employment of the imagination in factual and fictional representations, and then questioning the 
role of the imagination in engaging with representations at all (Fiction and Narrative [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014]).  As my aim is to delineate an uncontroversial characterisation of narrative, I shall 
neither contribute to this debate nor employ the imagination in my elucidation of narrative representation. 
2 Peter Goldie notes the possibility of narratives with no human characters, but excludes these from his 
discussion (The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012], 19 
fn.20).  I shall not stipulate that the agents must be human, merely that they are capable of intentional action, 
such as the anthropomorphised rabbits in Richard Adams’ Watership Down and the false Maria robot in Fritz 
Lang’s Metropolis. 
3 Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 2. 
4 Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 49. 
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component sentences are tensed but also in that there must be a temporal relation 
between the events, even if just that of simultaneity.5 
I shall accept this loose temporal connection for minimal narratives, the consequence of 
which is that the following meets the criteria for a minimal narrative: “Katy kicked the stone 
and missed her bus.”  As such, Currie is correct to claim that it is not the concept “narrative” 
that is philosophically interesting, but ‘the concept thing high in narrativity.’6 
 
In contrast to a minimal narrative, an exemplary narrative7 is the product of an agent that is 
high in narrativity in virtue of representing:  
(i) one or more agents and  
(ii)  two or more events which are  
(iii)  causally connected,    
 (iv) thematically unified, and 
 (v) conclude. 
Regarding (iii), Noël Carroll proposes the following connection: ‘the earlier events in the 
sequence are at least causally necessary conditions for the causation of later events and/or 
states of affairs (or are contributions thereto).’8  I shall accept that non-minimal narratives 
have a causal connection between events and that exemplary narratives have a causal 
connection which is so strong as to contribute to the thematic unity of the narrative.  Currie 
defines thematic unity as follows: 
unity is provided by a focus on some common thread in the activity of particular 
persons in particular connected circumstances, though narratives often do have, in 
                                                 
5 Lamarque, Opacity of Narrative, 52. 
6 Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 34. 
7 The term is from Currie; see: Narratives & Narrators, 35. 
8 Carroll, Beyond Aesthetics, 126. 
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addition, general thematic unity in that we are invited to generalize from the case in 
question.9 
Carroll divides narratives into two broad categories: episodic narratives, consisting of smaller 
stories where causal linkage is weak and frequently achieved by means of a recurring 
protagonist; and unified narratives, where causal linkage is high and there is a smooth 
transition from beginning to middle to end.10  The significance of thematic unity restricts 
exemplary narratives to the latter. 
 
In his taxonomy of historical representations, Hayden White identifies the absence of closure 
as characterising a text as a chronicle rather than a narrative: a chronicle merely terminates in 
medias res, leaving the reader to impose his or her own meaning upon the sequence of events 
represented.11  Carroll describes the phenomenon as ‘the almost palpable sensation that the 
story has finished-up at exactly the right spot.’12  In the taxonomy I am establishing, 
chronicles meet the criteria for minimal narratives, but not exemplary narratives.  White’s 
insistence on the importance of closure might be considered overly-demanding, however, and 
Carroll claims that soap operas and national histories are examples of exemplary narratives 
without closure.13  Soap operas are indeed high in narrativity, but they lack thematic unity 
and are episodic in nature.  Every soap opera has several stories running parallel, usually 
involving characters who live in the same place, and the narrativity within these sub-
narratives may be high despite the absence of an overarching, thematic connection.  National 
histories are similar in that they take a place as their primary focus, involve a large number of 
characters and sub-narratives, and are typically lacking in an overarching theme.  On the 
basis that they are at best borderline cases, I shall exclude both soap operas and national 
                                                 
9 Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 39. 
10 Carroll, Minerva’s Night Out, 123. 
11 White, “Value of Narrativity,” 21-23. 
12 Carroll, Minerva’s Night Out, 123. 
13 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 355-356. 
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histories from the category of exemplary narratives.  Given (iii) to (v) above, exemplary 
narratives can be distinguished from lists, annals, chronicles, and diaries.  Paradigmatic 
examples include: the Bayeux Tapestry, William H. Prescott’s History of the Conquest of 
Peru, Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, Orson 
Welles’ Citizen Kane, and Art Spiegelman’s Maus. 
 
2. Ethical Value & Narrative Representation 
 
If my definitions in §1 are accepted, then all narrative representations are concerned with 
agency in that they represent a minimum of a single agent and two events.  The combination 
of agency and events places narratives in the ethical sphere as all action (and inaction) is 
subject to ethical appraisal, even if that appraisal is that the action is permissible (rather than 
prohibited or obligatory) and therefore raises no ethical concerns.  There is thus a necessary 
relation between narrative representation and ethical value.  There are at least four ways of 
unpacking this relation: 
(a) In virtue of their narrativity, narrative representations can be evaluated 
ethically. 
(b) In virtue of their narrativity, narrative representations can provide knowledge 
when evaluated ethically. 
(c) In virtue of their narrativity, narrative representations should be evaluated 
ethically. 
(d) The value of narrative representations qua narrative representation is ethical 
value. 
If the combination of agency and events entails an ethical dimension to narrative 
representation, as I have suggested, then (a) is obviously – but also trivially – true.  Similarly, 
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(b) is obviously and trivially true of some narrative representations, but not others (especially 
minimal narratives, as I demonstrate below).  The claim in (d), that the value of narrative qua 
narrative (which is often conceived of as aesthetic value) is ethical value is the thesis that 
ethical value is partly or wholly constitutive of narrative value.  I make no such commitment 
in this paper and I shall therefore defend (c), the claim that narrative representations not only 
can, but should, be evaluated ethically in virtue of their narrativity.  Specifically, I shall 
defend the following relation between narrative representation and ethical value: 
(ENNR) The engagement with a narrative representation qua narrative 
representation is incomplete without ethical evaluation. 
 
I noted that narrative representation entails dual agency in §1: even a minimal narrative is the 
product of an agent in which (at least) one agent is represented.  I quoted Currie’s 
identification of the internal perspective as examining the world of the story as if it were 
actual.  Consider the following pair of minimal narratives: 
 (i) Katy kicked the stone and missed her bus. 
 (ii) Katy kicked the dog and ran away. 
Adopting the internal perspective, one evaluates Katy’s actions in both cases.  In the absence 
of further information, (i) is ethically permissible and (ii) ethically prohibited.  Currie 
describes the external perspective as seeing a vehicle, something that represents a sequence 
of events in virtue of the activity of an agent we call the author.  In adopting the external 
perspective it is not the agency of the agent in the narrative, but of the producer of the 
narrative – the author – that is judged.14  (ii) could be presented for the following purposes: 
(A) as an example of shameful behaviour; 
                                                 
14 For the purposes of this paper, I shall use “author” to describe the producer of a narrative regardless of the 
representational medium employed.  Some narrative representations feature a narrator who is distinct from the 
author, but I shall not discuss the complexities of this distinction (see: Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 65-69).  I 
shall also use “audience” to describe the people who engage with a narrative representation regardless of the 
medium in which that representation is experienced. 
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(B) as an example of admirable behaviour. 
From the internal perspective, Katy’s action is evaluated as unethical in both contexts; from 
the external perspective, the author is evaluated as ethical if he is criticising Katy’s action 
(A), but unethical if he is demonstrating how clever she was, e.g. in being able to inflict harm 
on the dog without being bitten (B).  The problem with (i) and (ii) is that the narratives are so 
minimal, communicating so little information, that there is barely any evidence to make an 
ethical evaluation of the represented agent and none at all for an ethical evaluation of the 
author.  Both examples remain the product of an agent for which ENNR is true, but they show 
that the ethical evaluation of narratives does not necessarily provide knowledge and is not 
even always possible from the external perspective. 
 
In §1 I identified the difference between minimal narratives and exemplary narratives as 
causal relations, thematic unity, and closure.  In exemplary narratives, authors combine these 
three features to create a perspective on the agents, settings, and events represented.  
Lamarque refers to this perspectival nature as follows: 
narratives are “opaque” somewhat as paintings are opaque.15  They have the same 
kind of intentionality, not just as products of intentions, but also, in different ways and 
to different degrees, through expressing thoughts or a point of view on what they 
represent.  This seems to be true of all narratives, not just those of literary fiction.16 
I shall employ opacity to distinguish the authorial perspective constitutive of an exemplary 
narrative from the framework produced thereby, which Currie identifies as ‘a preferred set of 
cognitive, evaluative, and emotional responses to the story.’17  He notes that there are no set 
                                                 
15 The opacity of paintings is that, unlike photographs, ‘they do not represent simply in virtue of standing in a 
causal relation to their subjects’ (Lamarque, Opacity of Narrative, 9). 
16 Lamarque, Opacity of Narrative, 9.  In this passage, Lamarque uses all narratives as similar, if not identical, 
to exemplary narratives, i.e. narrative representations as ‘complex, involving structure and connectedness and 
crucially involving a narrator’s point of view’ (Opacity of Narrative, 11). 
17 Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 86. 
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of explicit instructions, but that the framework is expressed in the representation of the 
sequence of events.  From this framework Currie proceeds to 
the standard mode of engagement with narrative.  Narratives, because they serve as 
expressive of the points of view of their narrators, create in our minds the image of a 
persona with that point of view, thereby prompting us to imitate salient aspects of it – 
notably evaluative attitudes and emotional responses.  In taking on those responses, 
we thereby come to adopt, wholly or in part, the framework canonical for that work.18 
The standard mode of engagement is thus the adoption, by audiences, of the framework that 
the author invites one to adopt. 
 
It is this framework – the preferred set of cognitive, evaluative, and emotional responses – 
that produces a more complex relation between narrative representation and ethical value in 
the case of exemplary narratives.  In contrast to minimal narratives, the necessary relation 
between narrative representation and ethical value in exemplary narratives is twofold: 
(ENEX) The engagement with an exemplary narrative qua narrative is 
incomplete without a dual ethical evaluation, from both the internal 
and external perspectives. 
The History of the Conquest of Peru and Citizen Kane therefore invite the following ethical 
evaluations: 
(1)  the agency of the characters represented in the narrative, represented as they 
are by the author within a particular framework; e.g., the agency of Francisco 
Pizarro or Charles Foster Kane. 
                                                 
18 Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 106. 
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(2) the agency of the author in telling the story, which includes the decision to 
represent the characters within a particular framework; e.g., the agency of 
Prescott or Welles. 
Both the actions of the characters in the story and action of the author in telling the story are 
subject to ethical appraisal and different authors can provide different frameworks for the 
same characters and events.  In Triumph of the Will, e.g., Riefenstahl frames Hitler as a 
messianic saviour who descends from the heavens to lead the German people to glory.  In 
contrast, Oliver Hirschbiegel frames Hitler as an evil megalomaniac who sacrifices millions 
of people – including the German nation – for his self-aggrandisement in Downfall.  If one 
rejects the standard mode of engagement for Triumph of the Will – Hitler as heroic – in 
adopting the internal perspective, then one will make a negative judgement of Riefenstahl for 
creating that framework in adopting the external perspective.19 
 
When discussing closure as a criterion of exemplary narratives in §1, I mentioned White, who 
maintains that narrative closure is a resolution that is presented by the author as either moral 
or immoral.20  When history is represented in a narrative rather than non-narrative form: 
The demand for closure […] is a demand […] for moral meaning, a demand that 
sequences of real events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral 
drama.21 
In the terminology I am employing, White is claiming that the standard mode of engagement 
with (historical exemplary) narrative representations requires the adoption of an internal 
perspective that prioritises ethical evaluation.  My claim is that the standard mode of 
                                                 
19 Riefenstahl denied the framework I have described here post-war, which is hardly surprising.  For an 
unsurpassed philosophical discussion of the film see: Mary Devereaux, “Beauty and evil: the case of Leni 
Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will,” in J. Levinson, ed., Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 227-256. 
20 White, “Value of Narrativity,” 23. 
21 White, “Value of Narrativity,” 24. 
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engagement with exemplary narratives requires the adoption of an internal perspective that 
involves ethical evaluation.  The greater complexity of the necessary relation between 
exemplary narratives and ethical evaluation on the one hand and minimal narratives and 
ethical evaluation on the other hand creates the need for a two-part thesis: 
(TNR) Narrative representations are essentially ethical in virtue of their combination 
of agency and events. 
(TEX) Exemplary narratives are essentially ethical in virtue of both the combination 
of agency and events represented and the agency of the author in inviting the 
adoption of a particular framework. 
 
TNR and TEX are neither controversial nor remarkable claims and would perhaps not even be 
interesting had they not served as springboards for so many erroneous conclusions about the 
relationship between narrative representation and ethical value.  I mentioned the following 
distinction in my abstract, which I have been employing heretofore and shall continue to 
employ (unless quoting directly): 
(I) Ethical as opposed to a-ethical or amoral, i.e. a positive, negative, or 
ambiguous evaluation of agency or character; and 
(II) Moral as opposed to immoral or unethical, i.e. a positive evaluation of agency 
or character.22 
Returning to the pair of examples above, both Triumph of the Will and Downfall have ethical 
value, but only Downfall has moral value.  My thesis, as articulated in TNR and TEX, is that 
                                                 
22 The difference is usually conceived in terms of “ethics” as a concern with social values and/or the good life 
and “morality” as a concern with judgement and/or the principles of right conduct.  The locus classicus of this 
distinction is Hegel’s critique of Kant’s Moralität (morality) in terms of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) in 
Phenomenology of Spirit and Elements of Philosophy of Right.  It is sometimes articulated in terms of ethics as 
descriptive and morality as normative, but this is an over-simplification – particularly when applied to the 
evaluation of narrative representations.  The distinction has been embraced by critical theory and developed by 
Jürgen Habermas, who contrasts moral discourse with ethical discourse in Justification and Application and The 
Inclusion of the Other.  In analytic philosophy, Bernard Williams adopted the distinction in Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy.  
11 
 
narrative representation is essentially ethical in virtue of its narrativity.  The erroneous 
conclusion to draw is that every narrative representation is essentially moral, i.e. subject to a 
positive ethical evaluation in virtue of its narrativity.  Conclusions such as this have, 
however, been reached in both the theoretical and philosophical approaches to narrative 
representation, where they are propagated from within the movements known as the “ethical 
turn” and “aesthetic education” respectively.  In order to avoid conflation with a distinction 
that can at times be subtle, I shall revise my two-part thesis as follows: 
(TRNR) Narrative representations are essentially ethical, but not essentially 
moral, in virtue of their combination of agency and events. 
(TREX) Exemplary narratives are essentially ethical, but not essentially moral, 
in virtue of both the combination of agency and events represented and 
the agency of the author in inviting the adoption of a particular 
framework. 
The arguments that narrative representations are essentially moral focus exclusively on 
exemplary narratives and I shall follow suit.  In the remainder of this paper I defend my 
deflationary account of the ethical value of exemplary narratives, TREX, against three 
inflationary accounts – from Nussbaum, Carroll, and Harpham respectively. 
 
3. The Moral Value of Novels 
 
The elevation of the ethical value of narrative representation to moral value has primarily 
focused on fictional narratives, especially – although not exclusively – literary fictions, 
usually understood as those fictions that are either judged as artistically or aesthetically 
valuable.  Patrick Fessenbecker describes the ethical turn at the end of the twentieth century 
as involving a confluence of three traditions: the neo-Aristotelian, exemplified by Nussbaum; 
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the challenge to scientistic epistemology, exemplified by Richard Rorty; and Levinasian 
poststructuralism, exemplified by Jacques Derrida.23  What each of these disparate strands 
holds in common is a belief that the literary experience, the experience of engaging with a 
literary work qua literature (however that is conceived in the respective traditions) is in some 
way essentially moral.  Within the ethical turn, more attention has been paid to literary 
narratives than lyric poetry and Rorty and Nussbaum focus on the narrative category of 
novels.24  Nussbaum narrows her focus even further, to the genre of ‘realist Anglo-
American’25 and ‘realist social’26 novels, of which the works of Charles Dickens, Henry 
James, Marcel Proust, and Richard Wright are paradigmatic.  I shall hereafter refer to this 
genre of exemplary narratives as realist novels.  Nussbaum’s approach takes the unity of 
literary form and literary content as its starting point.  As I am sympathetic to the view that 
there is a particularly intimate relationship between form and content in literature, I shall 
accept the inseparability relation without probing its precise nature, agreeing that form and 
content cannot be separated in the experience of a work of literature qua literature, although 
they can and are separated for critical and analytical purposes.27  Commentators have 
identified three ways in which Nussbaum binds form-content inseparability to moral value – 
literary content, literary form, and literary imagination – each of which I shall consider in 
turn.28 
 
                                                 
23 Fessenbecker, “Defense of Paraphrase,” 118. 
24 Richard Rorty’s nuanced contribution to the ethical turn is set out in: Contingency, irony, and solidarity (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).  
25 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 10. 
26 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 87. 
27 The various conceptions of form-content unity, which I discuss in detail in The Value of Literature (London: 
Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016), include the following relations: identity, indistinguishability, 
constitution, inseparability, and irreducibility.  Nussbaum is unclear as to the precise relation envisaged.  Due to 
the terminology employed in the quote immediately below I have characterised the relation as inseparability, but 
the same quote could also be conceived as a constitution relation, e.g. that form (partly) constitutes content. 
28 See, e.g., respectively: Patrick Gardiner, “Professor Nussbaum on The Golden Bowl,” New Literary History 
15 (1983), 179-184; Richard Eldridge, “‘Reading for Life’: Martha C. Nussbaum on Philosophy and Literature,” 
Arion 2 (1992), 187-197; and Cora Diamond, “Martha Nussbaum and the Need for Novels,” Philosophical 
Investigations 16 (1993), 128-153. 
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According to Nussbaum: ‘Literary form is not separable from philosophical content, but is, 
itself, a part of content – an integral part, then, of the search for and of the statement of 
truth.’29  A consequence of inseparability is that content cannot be paraphrased without loss 
of identity and, as a result, certain truths can only be conveyed in narrative form such that 
there is a unique kind of non-propositional moral knowledge communicated by realist novels.  
Realist novels are particularly suited to the Aristotelian conception of moral value because of 
their structural complexity, open-endedness, and concern with the ordinary and the 
everyday.30  The standard mode of engagement with these novels extends life horizontally by 
broadening the reader’s experience of people, places, and events, and vertically by the 
precision and richness of their representations.31  Nussbaum extends the moral value of realist 
novels to the political sphere, claiming that they promote liberal democracy.  The moral and 
political value of reading, e.g., Hard Times is that the novel ‘makes us acknowledge the equal 
humanity of members of social classes other than our own’.32  Dickens combines narrative 
form with moral content such that one cannot adopt the standard mode of engagement 
without accepting that the factory workers are fully human.  Hard Times thus embodies a 
liberal democratic vision in its framework, which is enacted by the novel’s form.33  Realist 
novels promote compassion as well as egalitarianism because ‘concern for the disadvantaged 
is built into the structure of the literary experience’.34  The moral content of realist novels 
cannot be separated from the narrative representation without loss of identity and the moral 
evaluation of a novel therefore requires that the moral content be judged in the narrative form 
in which it is presented in the novel rather than in a paraphrased (or otherwise-altered) form.  
                                                 
29 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 3. 
30 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 46-47. 
31 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 48. 
32 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 34. 
33 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 36. 
34 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 87. 
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Moral value is not only relevant to the literary value of Dickens’ works, but essential, 
because the novels cannot be read qua literature without accepting the morality promoted.35 
 
In the terms I set out in §2, Nussbaum advances the following claim: 
(MNRN) Realist novels are essentially moral in virtue of both the combination 
of agency and events represented and the agency of the author in 
inviting the adoption of the framework particular to the novel. 
In defence of MNRN, Nussbaum argues that novels with immoral frameworks do not 
constitute counter-examples to her position.  ‘Literature has great seductive power: it can get 
us to sympathize with class privilege, the oppression of women, war and pillage, and […] 
hideous racism.’36  Her point is that in the category she has selected (the novels of Dickens, 
James, Proust, and Wright) the narrative form is part and parcel of the moral value and this 
thesis is unaffected by the existence of other categories (e.g., the surrealist novels of Louis-
Ferdinand Céline and Henry Miller), where the narrative form is part and parcel of the 
negative (or ambiguous) ethical value.  The problem with this strategy is that it reveals 
Nussbaum’s thesis as at best restricted to philosophical methodology and at worst 
tautologous.  The novels of Dickens, James, Proust, and Wright have been selected precisely 
for their moral value in the first instance and MNRN therefore collapses into: 
(MNMN) Moral novels are essentially moral in virtue of both the combination of 
agency and events represented and the agency of the author in inviting 
the adoption of the framework particular to the novel. 
MNMN is not only compatible with my thesis, TREX, but fails to elevate the ethical value of 
narrative representation to moral value.  All exemplary narratives are essentially ethical and 
within the broad category of exemplary narratives sub-categories can be selected according to 
                                                 
35 Nussbaum, “Exactly and Responsibly,” 360. 
36 Nussbaum, “Exactly and Responsibly,” 355. 
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their ethical valence, e.g. realist novels (moral value) and surrealist novels (negative ethical 
value). 
 
The second approach to Nussbaum’s theory has focused on the substantive value of literary 
form, which is also expressed in terms of the literary experience as essentially moral.  Terry 
Eagleton offers a precise explanation of this conception of realist novels in the following two 
passages: 
(a) The classical realist novel is […] a moral practice in its very structure, shifting 
as it does from one centre of consciousness to another to constitute a complex 
whole.  Literature can therefore be seen as a moral project even before it has 
come to utter a moral sentiment.37 
(b) the exhausting, exhilarating process of tracking the microscopic twists and 
turns of meaning in The Ambassadors or The Golden Bowl is itself a moral 
experience, rather as the inordinate length of the Proustian sentence, its 
capacity to propel itself through any number of intricate sub-clauses and 
around any number of hairpin syntactical bends without losing its steady 
semantic thrust, is a stylistic performance with intimate relevance to questions 
of moral value.38 
In contrast to the focus on the moral value of literary content, which is characteristic of 
literary aesthetics, the focus on the moral value of literary form is characteristic of literary 
theory and tends to follow the theoretical approach in arguing on a case-by-case rather than 
categorical basis. 
 
                                                 
37 Eagleton, Event of Literature, 60. 
38 Eagleton, Event of Literature, 47. 
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The shifting structural complexity of realist novels is mentioned by both Eagleton and 
Nussbaum,39 but the feature is by no means restricted to the genre.  In his L.A. Quartet (The 
Black Dahlia, The Big Nowhere, L.A. Confidential, and White Jazz), James Ellroy employs 
parallel points of view and labyrinthine storylines to present a dark and disturbing vision of 
an oppressive, corrupt, racist, and homophobic mid-century Los Angeles.  The literary form 
of the Quartet becomes successively richer and more complex as the various protagonists 
become progressively more debased and irresponsible.  The detective duo of The Black 
Dahlia, Bucky Bleichert and Lee Blanchard, are choirboys in comparison with the only three 
central characters that survive the rigours of the Quartet – David Klein, Edmund Exley, and 
Dudley Smith.  The combination of formal innovation and downward moral spiral is most 
evident in White Jazz, where Ellroy uses the stream of consciousness style to original and 
subtle effect, creating an engrossing and compelling framework that invites admiration for 
Klein despite his many substantial moral flaws.  Ellroy’s series may not constitute an 
immoral practice in Eagleton’s terms, but it is certainly a morally ambiguous practice.  The 
problem for Nussbaum’s claims about the moral value of literary form is that it appears as if 
similar narrative means can be employed to disparate ethical ends.  Shifting structural 
complexity, microscopic twists and turns of meaning, inordinately long sentences, and stream 
of consciousness could all have different ethical valence if used by, e.g., either Henry James 
or James Ellroy.  There is thus no necessary relation between literary form and moral value.  
 
The third way in which Nussbaum’s claims about the moral value of realist novels have been 
defended is by recourse to the literary imagination.  Nussbaum maintains that the imaginative 
experience of reading realist novels qua literature promotes empathy and attention to the 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 139-142. 
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historical and social contexts of moral judgement.40  She associates literary content with 
responsiveness to moral particulars and literary form with the relation between particulars 
and universals that is constitutive of moral judgement.  The idea is that if form and content 
are inseparable, then the responsiveness to particulars cannot be isolated from the play back 
and forth between particular and universal.  In consequence, the literary imagination opens up 
possibilities for moral deliberation and action and the exercise of the literary imagination is a 
moral exercise.  The problem with this strategy is that it assumes a relation between the 
literary imagination and the moral (as opposed to ethical) imagination.  The experience of 
reading the novels of Samuel Beckett and William S. Burroughs is no less an exercise of the 
literary imagination than the experience of reading the novels of Dickens and Wright – and 
may well involve a more vigorous flexing of that imagination given the narrative 
experimentation of the former pair.  The experience of reading Murphy or Naked Lunch is 
much more likely to open up possibilities for deliberation on absurdity, nihilism, and 
misanthropy than empathy and attention to the historical and social contexts of moral 
judgement, however, and is therefore distinctly ethical in my terms.  All three versions of 
Nussbaum’s argument for the moral value of realist novels are thus revealed to suffer from 
the same flaw, the failure to demonstrate a relation between exemplary narratives and moral 
rather than ethical value.  Simply put: literary content, literary form, and the literary 
imagination can all vary in their ethical valence. 
 
4. The Virtue of Narrative Representation 
 
Carroll is usually associated with aesthetic education in philosophy rather than the ethical 
turn in criticism.  Aesthetic education, which originated with the Third Earl of Shaftesbury 
                                                 
40 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 115. 
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and was popularised by Friedrich Schiller, is the thesis that the experience of art provides a 
moral (and political) education.41  With regard to the moral value of narrative art, Carroll has 
a rigorous and sophisticated approach that begins at a similar point to that which I established 
in §2: ‘artworks that are narratives of human affairs are generally the kind of thing it makes 
sense both to talk about in ethical terms and to assess morally.’42  Carroll maintains that there 
is a necessary relation between narrative representation and moral judgement.43  The 
engagement with a narrative necessarily involves the mobilisation of the knowledge and 
emotions of readers or audiences, which includes the activation of moral beliefs and 
emotions, and thus necessarily exercises the moral powers of those engaging with the 
narrative.44  He regards the emotions as the basis of this link between work and response and 
the capacity of narrative representation to stimulate the moral emotions of audiences is 
crucial to his thesis.  As with Nussbaum on form-content inseparability, I shall accept this 
claim without analysing the details of his position.  Carroll maintains that narrative artworks 
can enrich the moral understanding of audiences, an approach he calls ‘the clarificationist 
view’.45  He is careful to ward off the objection that the knowledge yielded by artistic 
narrative representations is banal or platitudinous, maintaining that the refinement of virtue 
concepts is cognitively valuable because it cultivates greater discrimination and thereby 
enhances understanding.46  Carroll articulates the value of this refinement in his description 
of one of the means by which clarificationism operates, the deployment of a narrative device 
called a virtue wheel: 
                                                 
41 See: Third Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley-Cooper), Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times 
Volumes I-III (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1714 [2001]); and Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of 
Man: In a Series of Letters, trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1794 
[1967]).  Shaftesbury’s theory is spread throughout all three volumes of the Characteristics. 
42 Carroll, “Art, narrative, and moral understanding,” 138. 
43 Carroll’s conception of this relation is consistent with his view, expressed throughout Art in Three 
Dimensions and elsewhere, that both moral value and cognitive value are constitutive of artistic value, i.e. that 
there is a necessary relation between moral value and artistic value and between cognitive value and artistic 
value. 
44 Carroll, “Art, narrative, and moral understanding,” 141. 
45 Carroll, “Art, narrative, and moral understanding,” 142. 
46 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 216. 
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A virtue wheel or virtue tableau comprises a studied array of characters who both 
correspond and contrast with each other along the dimension of a certain virtue or 
package of virtues – where some of the characters possess the virtue in question, or 
nearly so, or part of it, while others possess the virtue, but only defectively, or not at 
all, even to such an extent that their lack of the virtue in question amounts to the vice 
that corresponds to the virtue.47 
 
One of the examples he employs is Dickens’ Great Expectations, where the following 
characters are compared in terms of their virtues as parents: Joe Gargery, Abel Magwitch, 
Miss Havisham, and Mrs Gargery.48  The novel is structured so as to juxtapose these 
characters, situating each at a different position on the virtue wheel.  The correspondence and 
contrast between the virtues and vices displayed by these characters in their respective roles 
as parents in the novel provides a sustained exploration of the concept of parenting by the 
studious variation of similarity and difference.  The virtue wheel is partly constitutive of 
Dickens’ framework.  In the standard mode of engagement readers adopt the framework and 
respond to the characters in terms of their respective virtues and vices, i.e. positively towards 
Joe and negatively towards his wife.  The practice serves to sharpen reader recognition ability 
and make explicit the criteria for the application of the relevant concepts, which is of 
particular use in moral cases, where concepts are typically vague or abstract.49  ‘In this, such 
virtue wheels serve the purpose of moral education’.50  Virtue wheels in works such as 
Sophocles’ Antigone, the mystery play Mankind, Great Expectations, and E.M. Forster’s 
Howards End share the function of conceptual clarification with thought experiments.  
Carroll is quick to address the charge that virtue wheels serve as nothing more than 
                                                 
47 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 217. 
48 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 217. 
49 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 220. 
50 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 220. 
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organisational devices aimed at preserving the coherence and unity of the work.  Virtue 
wheels do serve this purpose, as a formal device that enhances the thematic unity 
characteristic of exemplary narratives, but they also prompt self-reflection on the part of 
readers: 
Once the reader has begun to contemplate the pertinent virtues and their putative 
status in a given literary work, it is natural for her or him to reflect on how the 
characterizations implied by the text apply outside the text.  How are we to determine 
which virtues are true and which are false without considering the application of the 
relevant concepts outside the text?51 
 
The evidence Carroll offers for virtue wheels thus combines the theoretical, a rewarding 
interpretation of the respective works, with the empirical, the actual reader or audience 
response in the standard mode of engagement.  Drawing on an analysis of art history, Carroll 
offers further evidence that art has served a didactic purpose across space as well as time:  
unquestionably, in many of the artistic traditions of Asia, Africa, and Europe, art from 
time immemorial has served as a means for teaching about and meditating upon virtue 
and vice, often by example.52 
Most of Carroll’s elucidation is focused on literature, but he extends the existence of virtue 
wheels to all narrative art, including theatre, film, television, narrative painting, narrative 
sculpture, and dance.  ‘The virtue wheel is a structure that we encounter again and again in 
artworks, particularly narratives with more than one character.’53  The virtue wheel is thus 
part of the framework of certain narrative works of art such that the standard mode of 
engagement with those works clarifies the concept of the particular virtue represented and 
                                                 
51 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 233. 
52 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 225. 
53 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 223.  Carroll seems to be suggesting that the deployment of virtue wheels is 
not restricted to the category of exemplary narratives I defined in §1.  As the evidence for virtue wheels is 
strongest in exemplary narratives, I shall not discuss their deployment beyond this category. 
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thereby produces an increased moral understanding in readers or audiences.  Virtue wheels 
contribute to the high narrativity of exemplary narratives and those exemplary narratives that 
deploy virtue wheels therefore have moral value in virtue of their narrativity, i.e. virtue 
wheels evince a necessary relation between narrative representation and moral value. 
 
The problem with the particular link Carroll proposes between narrative representation and 
moral value is not its weakness, but its strength.  A virtue wheel is clearly an element of both 
narrativity (linked, in particular, to thematic unity) and moral value (the clarification of virtue 
concepts) in the examples Carroll employs.  Consider, however, D.W. Griffiths’ 1915 
prototype feature film, The Birth of a Nation.  The cinematic work is an exemplary narrative 
in which the Ku Klux Klan are portrayed as heroic defenders of liberty in the former 
Confederate States during the Reconstruction Era.  The narrative deploys a virtue wheel with 
regard to the concept of racial equality, presenting an especially complex formal structure due 
to the salience of racial identity to the instantiation of the virtue and vice in individuals, a 
complexity that is enhanced by the presence of mixed race characters.  The virtue wheel 
includes: Ben Cameron (white, opposes), Flora Cameron (white, opposes), Mammy (black, 
opposes), Austin Stoneman (white, supports), Silas Lynch (mixed race, supports), and Gus 
(black, supports).  There are various other characters, such as Elsie Stoneman and Lydia 
Brown, whose attitudes lie in between support and opposition, which is to be expected from a 
nuanced treatment of a virtue concept.  The problem is that the virtue wheel is not virtuous at 
all because the framework of which it is partly constitutive invites a standard mode of 
engagement of admiration for the Camerons and their loyal black servants and contempt for 
white abolitionists and non-whites who wish to assert their equality.  The virtue wheel in The 
Birth of a Nation would not therefore be an example of clarificationism for Carroll because 
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the presentation of racial equality as a vice works so as to obscure the virtue concept rather 
than clarify and refine it. 
 
Carroll’s argument for virtue wheels is, however, so compelling that it is clear that both types 
of narrative wheel – those which clarify and those which obscure moral concepts – contribute 
to the thematic unity, and thus narrativity, of the works in question.  For the sake of brevity I 
shall refer to the latter as vice wheels.  The vice wheel in The Birth of a Nation operates in a 
similar way to the virtue wheel in Great Expectations, but invites the adoption of an immoral 
framework on racial equality in contrast to the latter’s invitation to adopt to a moral 
framework on parenting.  In §3 I mentioned Henry Miller and Tropic of Cancer serves 
equally well here.  Miller’s semi-autobiographical novel deploys a vice wheel with regard to 
misogyny, establishing a framework that invites a standard mode of engagement in which 
Van Norden, who continually refers to women synecdochically by their genitals, is amusing 
and Fillmore, who marries a woman he has impregnated, is pathetic.  Narrative 
representations that deploy vice as opposed to virtue wheels have immoral value in virtue of 
their narrativity and the necessary relation is thus between narrative representation and ethical 
rather than moral value.  Although Carroll’s argument for the moral value of narrative 
representation is more rigorous than Nussbaum’s, it is also more sweeping: where she 
restricts her thesis to realist novels, he is clear that virtue wheels appear in a large proportion 
of exemplary narratives across the various narrative art forms.  He fails to account for vice 
wheels, however, which are counter-examples to the proposed necessary relation between 
narrativity and moral value.54  As with Nussbaum, my thesis accommodates the strengths of 
Carroll’s theory – the deployment of virtue wheels in some narrative representations – 
without erroneously elevating the necessary relation from ethical value to moral value.  
                                                 
54 Vice wheels are potentially doubly problematic for Carroll because they are both moral defects (promoting 
vice) and cognitive defects (obscuring concepts).  See: fn.43.  
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Exemplary narratives may clarify or obscure moral concepts in virtue of their narrativity and 
are thus, in my terms, essentially ethical. 
            
5. Closural Moral Order 
 
In his defence of the cognitive value of literature, Fessenbecker states that narrative 
representation entails commitment to propositions about agency, intention, and other features 
of subjectivity – which he summarises as ‘the moral-philosophical commitments inherent in 
narrative form’.55  In his terminology, therefore, my claim is that narrative form has inherent 
ethical commitments.  Harpham takes this conception a step further, not merely exploring the 
ethical commitments of narrative form, but reconceptualising narrative representation in 
ethical terms.  His starting point articulates his disillusion with contemporary research:       
One of the most obdurate problems in literary theory is narrative form, the study of 
which seems to have stalled since Aristotle’s statement that the plot of tragedy 
proceeds towards a moment of reversal, followed by recognition, and ending in a 
dénouement.  […]  But the attempt to define further the basic form of narrative has 
been virtually abandoned, defeated by the apparent shapelessness and singularity of 
extended narratives.’56 
Harpham seeks to identify the connection – temporal, causal, or thematic – between agency 
and event and recommends that narrative form be understood in terms of Hume’s distinction 
between is and ought, or fact and value.  Both the distinction and Hume’s purpose in 
describing it have been the subject of extensive debate, which has focused largely on what 
R.M. Hare refers to as Hume’s Law, the proposal that no “ought” can be derived from an 
                                                 
55 Fessenbecker, “In Defense of Paraphrase,” 121. 
56 Harpham, Shadows of Ethics, 35. 
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“is”.57  Harpham’s ultimate aim is to employ the relationship between narrative and ethics to 
establish a reciprocal relationship between literature and philosophy.  He maintains that 
ethics provides an explanation of narrative representation and that narrative in turn 
contributes to ethics by crossing the chasm between fact and value.58  My interest is neither in 
the proposed contribution of narrative to ethics nor the more fundamental relation between 
literature and philosophy, but in Harpham’s explanation of narrative form in exclusively 
ethical terms.59  This explanation is made by means of plot. 
 
I deliberately avoided characterising either minimal or exemplary narratives in terms of 
“plot” in §1, due to the variety of ways in which the word is employed across the 
philosophical and theoretical traditions.  White claims that narrative form is imposed upon a 
sequence of events in narrative history60 and this imposition is described as follows by Peter 
Goldie: 
This process, which […] I will call emplotment, is one by which a bare description of 
events, such as one might find in an annal or chronicle, can be transformed into a 
narrative, giving coherence, meaningfulness, and evaluative and emotional import to 
what is narrated.61 
Emplotment is thus the procedure by which a sequence of real or fictional events is 
represented in narrative form and plot distinguishes representations with narrative form from 
those without.  Both White’s discussion and Goldie’s description imply that plot is restricted 
to exemplary narratives, and Harpham’s definition follows suit: 
                                                 
57 Hare, Moral Thinking, 16.  Hume sets out the distinction in Book III, Part 1, Section (i) of the Treatise.  See: 
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1740 [1888]), 469. 
58 Harpham, Shadows of Ethics, 37 & 43. 
59 I am sceptical of Harpham’s conception of narrative’s contribution to ethics and although the relation he 
envisages is reciprocal, each of the two aspects can be considered in isolation. 
60 White, “Value of Narrativity,” 23. 
61 Goldie, The Mess Inside, 9. 
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The most general and adequate conception of a narrative plot is that it moves from an 
unstable inaugural condition, a condition that is but ought not – a severance of the two 
[fact and value] – through a process of sifting and exploration in search of an 
unknown but retrospectively inevitable condition that is and truly ought-to-be.62 
A narrative representation is formed by the process of emplotment, emplotment entails 
movement from the condition of is-but-ought-not-to-be to the condition of is-and-ought-to-
be, and narrative form is therefore essentially ethical. 
 
Two necessarily over-simplified examples will serve to illustrate Harpham’s 
reconceptualisation:   
(a) The plot of Downfall moves from Traudl Junge’s pride at being selected as 
one of Hitler’s personal secretaries in 1942 (is-but-ought-not-to-be) to her 
decision to remain loyal in the Führerbunker to the shame she experiences 
after the war (is-and-ought-to-be). 
(b) The plot of Hard Times moves from Thomas Gradgrind’s attempts to inculcate 
relentlessly pragmatic values in the children of Coketown (is-but-ought-not-to-
be) to his recognition of the limitations of pure rationalism and thence to his 
rejection of utilitarian philosophy (is-and-ought-to-be). 
The is-and-ought-to-be captures the significance of closure that I emphasised in §1, which in 
turn drew on Carroll’s statement that a narrative that concludes gives the feeling that it has 
ceased at precisely the right point, i.e. is retrospectively inevitable in Harpham’s terms.  
Closure contributes to the narrative framework, which forms the basis of the audience’s 
ethical evaluation of the author.  The standard mode of engagement with (a) and (b) invites 
one to view both Traudl and Gradgrind as misguided individuals who – to some extent at 
                                                 
62 Harpham, Shadows of Ethics, 36. 
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least – come to realise the error of their respective ways.  As such, both Hirschbiegel and 
Dickens are subject to positive ethical evaluation from the external perspective. 
 
Although Harpham is critical of Nussbaum for elevating the ethical value of novels to the 
moral, he makes a similar error.63  Here, he identifies a problem in White to which he 
believes his explanation of narrative form in ethical terms has provided the solution: 
The difficulty, as one of White’s critics has pointed out, lies in the apparent 
suggestion that there are as many moral orders as there are narratives.  But if we 
define closure in the way I have suggested, we can see that closure achieves a moral 
order that is “other” to that which preceded it, an other to whatever it is in the 
narrative that is but ought not to be.  There are an infinite number of narratives, but 
only one closural moral order, which is other not to other narratives but to the 
incessant questing of all narrative for formal closure.  Insofar as our aesthetic 
education acclimates us to narrative, then, it instructs us in ethics.64 
Recall from §2 that White maintains narrative histories are distinguished from non-narrative 
historical representations (annals and chronicles) by providing an ethical resolution, i.e. the 
author passes judgement on the sequence of events represented as either moral, immoral, or 
morally ambiguous.  The criticism mentioned by Harpham is that there are many moral – 
ethical in my terms – orders because White’s theory accommodates both Riefenstahl and 
Hirschbiegel’s representations of Hitler as narrative histories.  In contrast, Harpham is 
pursuing a closural moral order and attempting to relate narrativity to moral rather than 
ethical value. 
 
                                                 
63 Harpham, Shadows of Ethics, 220-242. 
64 Harpham, Shadows of Ethics, 43.  It is not clear to me that the existence of numerous moral – i.e., ethical in 
my terms – orders in White is problematic, but my interest here is in Harpham’s solution whether or not the 
problem exists. 
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Harpham has previously made the uncontroversial statement that concern by the self for the 
other is essential to ethics: ‘I see this intimate and dynamic engagement with otherness as the 
key to the kingdom of ethics: where such an engagement is, there is ethics.’65  This 
conception of moral philosophy, popular in the theoretical tradition, is derived from 
Levinas.66  With regard to the ethical turn in criticism, Derek Attridge describes the relevance 
of Levinas’ focus on the other in terms of literature’s ‘apprehension of otherness’, i.e. the 
capacity of literary works to confront and challenge readers’ expectations and values.67  With 
regard to narrative representation, Harpham’s idea is that the is-and-ought-to-be of closure is 
other to the is-but-ought-not-to-be with which the plot is inaugurated.  In (i) and (ii) above, 
therefore, the respective plots move from an unstable condition, Junge’s pride and 
Gradgrind’s pragmatism, to an inevitable closure, Junge’s shame and Gradgrind’s rejection of 
utilitarianism.  The conditions of closure are different from – other to – the conditions of 
inauguration and the process of exploration thus involves a dynamic engagement with 
otherness and consequently has moral rather than ethical value.  As plot, i.e. movement from 
is-but-ought-not-to-be to is-and-ought-to-be is, is characteristic of all exemplary narratives, 
Harpham has established the desired link: all narrative representations that are high in 
narrativity exhibit a closural moral order and there is thus a necessary relation between 
narrativity and moral value. 
 
Concern for the other is indeed ethical and is also usually, but not necessarily, moral.  My 
objection to Harpham is the by now familiar case of narrative representations with negative 
ethical value, which I shall consider in the terminology he employs.  In the respective 
narratives of Triumph of the Will and The Birth of a Nation the otherness that the standard 
                                                 
65 Harpham, Shadows of Ethics, x. 
66 See, e.g.: Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1961 [2007]); Ethics and Infinity, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1982). 
67 Attridge, Singularity of Literature, 67. 
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mode of engagement requires the audience to apprehend involves the adoption of frameworks 
which promote the NSDAP and KKK.  Levinas is correct in claiming that ethics begins with 
interest in the well-being of an other instead of – or in addition to – self-interest, but interest 
in the other is a necessary rather than sufficient condition of moral agency.  The plots of both 
Triumph of the Will and The Birth of a Nation, e.g., are inaugurated with an is-but-ought-not-
to-be, explore and apprehend otherness, and close with an is-and-ought-to-be.  Neither 
closural order could, however, be considered moral because the otherness that the standard 
mode of engagement requires one to assimilate is clearly immoral in both cases.  Closural 
orders are not simply made moral by embracing otherness and – like novels and virtue/vice 
wheels – can be moral, immoral, or morally ambiguous.  The necessary relation expressed in 
the definition of plot as the movement from is-but-ought-not-to-be to is-and-ought-to-be is 
thus between narrativity and ethical value and Harpham’s attempt to link narrativity with a 
closural moral order fails. 
     
Despite my criticism of closural moral order, Harpham’s reconceptualisation of narrative 
form in ethical terms is worth preserving for its illumination of the ethical essence of 
narrative representation.  In §2, I claimed that the combination of agency and events in 
narratives entails an ethical dimension to narrative representation the consequence of which is 
that the engagement with a narrative representation qua narrative representation is incomplete 
without ethical evaluation.  I then argued that the ethical dimension is more complex in 
exemplary narratives, which are essentially ethical in virtue of both the combination of 
agency and events represented and the agency of the author in inviting the adoption of the 
framework particular to the narrative.  Harpham’s conception of the emplotment 
characteristic of exemplary narratives as entailing movement from the condition of is-but-
ought-not-to-be to the condition of is-and-ought-to-be articulates the necessity of the 
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relationship between exemplary narratives and ethical value without prioritising ethical value 
above other narrative values (e.g., cognitive value and aesthetic value).  The claim that 
exemplary narratives are essentially ethical is thus restricted to the thesis that they are 
essentially subject to a dual ethical evaluation.  From the internal perspective the actions of 
the characters, whether real or fictional, may be judged as if they were actual; from the 
external perspective, the author may be judged for the is-and-ought-to-be with which he or 
she concludes the narrative; like the actions of the characters, the author’s is-and-ought-to-be 
may be moral, immoral, or morally ambiguous.  My conclusion is therefore that there is 
nothing about narrative representation – whether exemplary or minimal – that entails moral 
value, only ethical value.  In colloquial terms, every story does indeed have a moral, but that 
moral may be virtuous, vicious, or somewhere in between. 
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